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In view of these decisions, reliance

should not be placed on a description in a deed of a way as a boundary,
and perhaps the advice given in Milliken v. Denny should be followed:
"If purchasers wish to acquire a right of way or other easement over
other lands of their grantor, it is very easy to have it so declared in
the deed of conveyance." 21
CALVIN C. WALLACE

State Torts Claims Act-Right of Subrogation'
Does the right of subrogation exist under the provisions of the
"Tort Claims against State Departments and Agencies Act" ?2 This
question was recently answered affirmatively by the North Carolina
2 141 N. C. 224, 231, 53 S.E. 867, 870 (1906).
1The purpose of this note is not a detailed discussion of either subrogation or
Tort Claims Acts but is merely to bring an important decision interpreting the
Tort Claims Act of North Carolina to the attention of legal profession.
For a discussion of the Federal Tort Claims Act see, Baer, Suing Uncle Sam
in Tort, 26 N. C. L. REv. 119 (1948) ; Fisher, The Federal Tort Clains Act after
Five Years, 3 MEacER L. REv. 263 (1952) ; Hiley, A Review of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 14 GA. B. J. 301 (1952) ; Jackson, The Tort Clains Act-The Federal Government Assumes Liability in Tort, 27 Nim. L. Rnv. 30 (1947) ; Woolston,
Federal Tort Claims Act Digest, 28 DICTA 143 (1951); Note, 4 Wyo. L. 3. 96
(1949) ; Comments, 42 ILL. L. Rnv. 344 (1947), 56 YALE L. J. 534 (1947).
For a comparison of the Federal Act and the English Act see Street, Tort
Liability of the State: The Federal Tort Claims Act and The Crown; Proceedings Act, 47- MIcH. L. Rxv. 341 (1949).
See generally for discussions of tort liability of various states, Oberst, The
Board of Claims Act of 1950, 39 Ky. L. J. 35 (1950) (Kentucky) ; Troxell,
Tort Responsibility of the District of Columbia, 19 B. A. D. C. 504 (1952) (District of Columbia); Note, 8 MONT. L. REv. 45 and 97 (1947) (Montana); Comments, 23 IND. L. Rry. 468 (1948) (Indiana), 47 N. W. U. L. Rv. 914 (1953)
(Illinois), 90 OHIO St. L. J. 501 (1948) (Ohio), 23 So CALIF. L. REv. 507 (1950)
(California), 27 TEx. L. REv. 337 (1949) (Texas).
Also see Borchard, Tort Claims agabist Government: Municipal, State and
Federal Liability, 3 A. B. A. J. 221 (1947); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability,
48 MICH. L. Rtv. 41 (1949).
In regard to subrogation generally, see, Gleason and Intrater, A New Trend
it Subrogation, 38 Gao. L. J. 646 (1950) ; Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of
Slebrogation, 3 MD. L. Ray. 201 (1939). Also, see generally, 50 Al. Jun. Subrogation §§ 1-147 (1944).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to 143-300 (1952). The pertinent section, N. C.
GEIN. STAT. § 143-291 (1952), reads in material part as follows: "The State
Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing
and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the State
Highway and Public Works Commission, and all other departments, institutions,
and agencies of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine whether
or not each individual claim arose as a result of a negligent act of a State employee while acting within the scope of his employment and without contributory
negligence on the part of the claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is
asserted. If the Commission finds that there was such negligence on the part of
a State employee while acting within the scope of his employment proximately
causing the injury and no contributory negligence on the part of the claimant
or person in whose behalf the claim is asserted, the Commission shall determine
the amount of damages the claimant is entitled to be paid, including medical and

other expenses ....

but damage awarded shall not exceed $8,000."

For a summary of the North Carolina Act see, A Survey of Statutory Changes
hi North Carolina in 1951, 29 N. C. L. Ray. 351, 416 (1951).
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Supreme Court in Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. N. C. State Board of Education and/or Sampson County Board of Education.3 In deciding this
case of first impression, 4 the Court turned to the decisions of the federal
and state courts on the question.
This same question, with reference to Section 931 of the Federal
Tort Claims Act,5 caused much conflict in decisions of the lower federal
courts. In some instances, the subrogee's cause of action was dismissed
on the ground that the Act being in derogation of sovereign immunity
and thus to be strictly construed could not, in the absence of express
authorization, be interpreted as including subrogees. 6 On the other
hand, motion to dismiss the subrogee was in most cases overruled on
the ground that even if statutes waiving immunity to suit must be
strictly construed, they must also be interpreted in the light of legislative intent and if the intention were to include subrogees, then in the
absence of express exemption they are included.7 Thus two time
-238 N. C. 24, 76 S.E. 2d 553 (1953).

'This was an action for damages to the plaintiff's automobile, resulting from
negligence of a state employee, wherein recovery was also sought upon the subrogated rights of the plaintiff's insurer, which had paid a portion of the damage.
60 STAT. 843 (1946), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110,
2401, 2412, 2671 to 2680 (Supp. 1950).
Most of the litigation concerned 28 U. S. C. § 931 (1946) of the old Judicial
Code, which under the revision of the Judicial Code (effective Sept. 1, 1948,
PuB. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. [June 25, 1948]) is now divided and with
immaterial changes appears at 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2674 (Supp. 1950).
28 U. S. C. § 931 (1946) provided in pertinent part that: ". . . the United
States District Court for the district wherein the plaintiff is resident or wherein
the act or omission complained of occurred . . . sitting without a jury, shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any claim
against the United States for money only ... on account of damage to or loss
of property or on account of personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission or any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage,
loss, injury, or death in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the United States
shall be liable in respect to such claims to the same claimants, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. .. "
'Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 333, 335 (E.D.
N. Y. 1948) ("What counts is a specific grant by Congress to a specific person
of the right to bring a specific form of action against the United States, which
were it not for that statute would be barred."); Cascade County, Montana v.
United States, 75 F. Supp. 850, 852 (D. Mont. 1948) ("Sovereignty . . . raises
a presumption against suability, unless it is clearly shown; . . . courts should
not enlarge the liability conferred beyond what the language requires") ; accord, Bewick v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 730 (N. D. Tex 1947); Old Colony
Ins. Co. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Ohio 1947) ; Rusconi v. United
States. 74 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1947) ; ef. Gray v. United States, 77 F. Supp.
869 (D. Mass. 1948) (subrogee's cause of action dismissed on grounds he was
not "real party in interest").
"South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 594
(E. D. S. C. 1948) ; Town of Amherst v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 80 (W. D.
N. Y. 1948) ; Ins. Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 951, 952
(E. D. Va. 1948) ("Well established and readily admitted is the rule that statutes
waiving the immunity . . . must be strictly construed. But just as impelling is
the duty of the court to follow the intent of the Congress to make the United

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

honored canons of construction met head-on. 8
The conflict in the district courts as to the interpretation of the
Federal Tort Claims Act as applied to subrogated claims was clarified
somewhat in the Courts of Appeals. In ten cases decided on appeal in
eight circuits the subrogee's right to sue in his own name was sustained
in eight decisions,) and in only one was the subrogee's cause of action
denied altogether. That decision was later re-argued and modified to
States fully liable. . . ."); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. and Commissioners of State
Ins. Fund v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 850 (S. D. N. Y. 1948) ; Forrester v.
United States, 75 F. Supp. 272 (E. D. Wis. 1947); Wojciuk v. United States,
74 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E. D. Wis. 1947) ("It would be a strained and unwarranted
interpretation of the intention of Congress to say it planned to give the district
courts jurisdiction of cases brought by claimants originally suffering loss, but
to reserve to itself the consideration of the claims of those standing in the shoes
of the original claimants by operation of law.") ; Hill v. United States, 74 F.
Supp. 129 (N. D. Texas 1947) ; accord, Grace to use of Grangers Mut. Ins. Co.
v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 174 (D. Md. 1948) (held that derivative claims as
such are not allowed but the damaged party could join the subrogee as an
equitable party who would be entitled to some part or the whole of the recovery).
'Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E. D. Wis. 1947) (Congress took great care in designating twelve different categories of claims which
the Tort Claims Act was not intended to cover and none of the twelve categories
includes subrogees; therefore the doctrine of expressio imius est exclusio alterius
may be invoked). Bid see Cascade County, Montana v. United States, 75 F.
Supp. 850, 853 (D. Mont. 1948). The doctrine of statutory construction, expressio unius est exchsio alterius is well recognized. See, e.g., Rybbott v. Jarrett, 112 F. 2d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1940). See also 50 Am. JuR., Statutes § 434
(1944) and cases there cited. For a discussion of strict construction of statutes
waiving sovereign immunity see, 49 AM. JuR., States, Territories, and Dependencies, § 97 (1943).
' State Farm Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F. 2d 737 (1st
Cir. 1949), reversing Gray v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1948);
South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 893 (4th Cir.
1948), affirming South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 78 F.
Supp. 594 (E. D. S. C. 1948); Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States and Home
Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 374 (3rd Cir. 1948), reversing Yorkshire Ins.
Co. v. United States and Home Ins. Co. v. United States, Civil No. 10417 and
10418, D. N. J., Nov. 13, 1947, cert. granted 336 U. S. 960 (1949) ; United States
v. Chicago, R. I. & P- Ry., 171 F. 2d 377 (10th Cir. 1948); National American
Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 206 (9th Cir. 1948), reversing National
American Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, Civil No. 872, S. D. Cal., Nov. 21,
1947; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 170 F. 2d 469 (2d Cir.
1948), reversing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 333
(E. D. N. Y. 1948), cert. granted, 336 U. S. 960 (1949); Old Colony Ins. Co.
v. United States, 168 F. 2d 931 (6th Cir. 1948), reversing Old Colony Ins. Co. v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 723 (S. D. Ohio 1947); Employer's Fire Ins. Co, v.
United States, 167 F. 2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948) (subrogee's motion to intervene
granted), reversing Rusconi v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 669 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
Holding in Old Colony Ins. Co. v. United States, 168 F. 2d 931 (6th Cir.
1948) that Congress intended that subrogees should be included in the Act, the
court said: "If Congress had intended to exclude subrogees from the benefits
of the Act, it could have readily included them in the list of twelve specific
exemptions." 168 F. 2d at 933. See 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (Supp. 1950) for the
claims expressly excluded from the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Congress has demonstrated that it can find the recauisite language to bar a
subrogee's suit. See Foreign Claims Act, 55 STAT. 880 (1943), as amended 31
U. S. C. § 224(d) (1946) (". . . to consider . . . and make payments . . .
of claims, including claims of insured but excluding claims of subrogees...
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allow the subrogee to join as an equitable party or sue in the name of
the subrogor.10
The Government in contesting the validity of derivative claims by
subrogees under the Tort Claims Act contended that considerations
other than the language of the Act itself barred action by subrogees,
arguing that subrogation constituted "assignment" within the meaning
The "Anti-Assignment" Act,
of the Assignment of Claims Act."
however, as the Assignment of Claims Act is commonly called, has
long been held to apply only to voluntary assignments,' 2 while subrogation is essentially assignment by operation of law. Thus it was held
that subrogated claims would not be barred by the "Anti-Assignment"
3
Act.'
As decisions were handed down by the lower federal courts the
numerical majority allowed suit by the subrogee' 4 until the United
States Supreme Court finally laid the question to rest in 1949 by holding in United States v. Aetna Casualty,& Surety Co.' 5 that the subrogee could sue and recover in his own name. In that case the "AntiAssignment" Act was not asserted by the Government as a complete
bar to the derivative claim of the subrogee, but only to require that
suit be brought in the name of the insured for the use of insurer to
protect the procedural rights of the United States.' 6 That argument
1

United States v. Hill, 171 F. 2d 404 (5th Cir. 1948), reversing Hill v.

United States, 74 F. Supp. 129 (N. D. Tex. 1947), re-argued and modified 174
F. 2d 61 (5th Cir. 1949).

The "Anti-Assignment" Act, which is discussed

infra, was on re-argument held to bar recovery by the subrogee in his own

name.
11
REv.

§ 3447 (1853), 31 U. S. C. § 203 (1946), as amended, 61
STAT.
The Act, commonly
STAT. 501, 508 (1947), 31 U. S. C. § 203 (Supp. 1950).
called the "Anti-Assignment" Act, prohibits the assignment of claims against
the United States.
12 See note 17 infra.
18 State Farm Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F 2d 737 (1st Cir.
1949); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 893
(4th Cir. 1948) ; North American Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 171 F. 2d 206
9th Cir. (1948) (assignment surplusage since claim arose by operation of law) ;
Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 914 (E. D. Wis. 1947) (subrogation differs from assignment or transfer since it is an act of law, and a creature of
equity and justice); Ins. Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp.
951 (E. D. Va. 1948) ; Forrester v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 272 (E. D. Wis.
1947). Contra: Cascade County, Montana v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 850
(D. Mont. 1948) ; Bewick v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 730 (N. D. Tex. 1947).
See Annotation, 12 A. L. R. 2d 460 (1950) for examples of transfers barred by
the "Anti-Assignment" Act.
notes 6, 7, 9, and 10 supra.
1See
15338 U. S. 366 (1949).
0
Id. at 371. It was stated that the purpose of invoking the "Anti-Assignment" Act was two-fold: (1) to avoid involving the United States in litigation
as to the existence or extent of subrogation; and (2) to insure that suits would
be brought in the names of the original claimants so that the United States could
avail itself of its statutory rights in respect of venue, and of counter-claim and
offset on account of any cross-claims it might have against the original claimants.
It was further contended that the congressional intent was that the "Anti-Assignment" Act should apply.
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was rejected by the Court and the "Anti-Assignment" Act held inapplicable.' 7 In commenting on the doctrine of strict construction of
statutes waiving sovereign immunity, the Court felt that the congressional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act was reflected by Justice
Cordozo when he said in speaking of a waiver of immunity statute
of New York: "The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves
hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add
to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced." 18
Few state decisions have dealt with the question raised in the principal case. 19 In a suit by a subrogated claimant under a South Carglina statute2° in 1930, the court held that statutes waiving sovereign
immunity must be strictly construed and in the absence of express provision for subrogated claims they must fail. 21 Cothran, J. concurred
in the result of the decision in that the claim should fail because of
failure to file a claim within the time specified by the statute22 but dis1United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 372, 374, 376
(1949). The Court held that even the limited application of the "Anti-Assignment" Act contended for was untenable because of the uniform interpretation
for the past 75 years that assignments by operation of law are not within the
prohibition of the Act [See, e.g., Western Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 268
U. S.271, 275 (1925) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Downie, 218 U. S.345, 356
(1910) ; Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S.410, 421 (1899) ; Goodman v. Niblack, 102
U. S. 556, 560 (1880)], and because of many affirmative indications of Congressional intent that subrogated claims should not be excluded from suit in the
name of the subrogee under the Tort Claims Act. These indicia included the
allowance of subrogated claims under the old Small Claims Act, 42 STAT. 1066,
31 U. S. C. § 215 (1922), which was repealed by the present Tort Claims Act
[See, e.g., 21 Comp. GEN. 341 (1941); 36 Ors. Ary. GEN. 553 (1932); H. R.
Rep. No. 5065, 72 Cong., 1st Sess (1932)], and the explicit exclusion of subrogees from the Foreign Claims Act, 55 STAT. 880 (1942), as amended, 57 STAT.
66 (1943), 31 U. S. C. § 224 (d) (1946).
The Court also pointed out the correct application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to subrogation under the Tort Claims Act. This aspect of the
problem is beyond the purview of this note. For discussions of the problem
before the decision in the Aetna Casualty case, see Notes, 28 NEB. L. REy. 430
(1949),
58 YALE L. J. 1395 (1949).
"8 Anderson v. John L. Haynes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E.
28, 29 (1926).
"Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. N. C. State Board of Education and/or Sampson
County Board of Education, 238 N. C. 24, 76 S.E. 2d 553 (1953).
20Act of March 10, 1928, 35 STAT. L. p. 2055, now codified as S. C. CODE
§ 5887 (1) (1942), which provides in part: "Any person, firm or corporation
who may suffer injury to his or her person or damage to his, her, or its property
by reason of a defect in any State Highway, or by reason of the negligent operation of any vehicle or motor vehicle in charge of the State Highway Department . . . may bring suit against the State Highway Department. . . ." The
act also provided that in order to have a cause of action a claim must be filed
with the State Highway Department within ninety days after the alleged injury
or damage.
"1United States Casualty Co. v. State Highway Dept., 155 S.C. 77, 151 S.E.
887 (1930).
22 "If the claim of the insurance company to subrogation could be sustained,
it could only be to the cause of action which the owner of the car may have had
against the department, and, the complaint containing no allegation that a claim
was filed within the time required, it is lacking in an essential element of a cause
of action under the Act." Id. at 87, 151 S.E. at 891.
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sented in that it would be an illogical conclusion to construe the statute
so as to exclude all subrogated claims.2 -3 This South Carolina decision
was quoted and followed by the Kansas Supreme Court 24 and then the
South Carolina and Kansas decisions were followed by the Supreme
Court of Alabama. 25
In 1950 the question of the validity of subrogated claims again
came before the South Carolina Supreme Court in the Jeff Hunt
Machinery case,26 wherein the court in substance reversed its position
by holding that a plaintiff could bring an action notwithstanding the
fact that he had been reimbursed for his loss by an insurer and was
bringing the action for the insurer's benefit. The court pointed out
that it had uniformly held that statutes waiving the State's immunity
from suit, being in derogation of sovereign immunity, must be strictly
construed, and that the state could be sued only in the manner and
upon the terms and conditions prescribed by statute. However, it
added that statutes of that kind are not to be construed to such an
extent as to defeat the legislative intent, as the rule of strict construction is subject to the principle that all rules of statutory interpretation
are merely for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the legisla27
ture as expressed in the statute.
23Justice

Cothran felt that the fundamental error of the majority was the

conclusion that the Act created a liability.

In his opinion it merely provided

a remedy where none existed before, thereby raising the controlling issue of

whether the owner of a fixed claim and a fixed remedy under the Act had the
right to assign his claim to his insurer. Under ordinary circumstances the right
would not be questioned. Thus, Justice Cothran thought that to say, under a

rule of strict construction, that because the act does not give the assignee of a
claim the right to sue, he does not come within its protection, would be an exceedingly narrow and unjustified contradiction of the purpose of the act, which
evidently was that the department should be held responsible for the consequences
of its delicts. Aside from that, when a state vests one with a fixed right and
a fixed remedy, it follows necessarily that it intended to vest in him every incident
of those rights, one of which is the right to assign them. United States Casualty
Co. v. State Highway Department, 155 S. C. 88, 89, 151 S.E. 891 (1930) (dissenting
and concurring opinion).
2
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 146 Kan.
239, 69 P. 2d 1091 (1937).
" Turner v. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 235 Ala. 632, 180 So. 300 (1938).
"Jeff Hunt Machinery Co. v. State Highway Dept.,.217 S. C. 423, 60 S.E.
2d 859 (1950). When it was contended that the question had been concluded by
United States Casualty Co. v. State Highway Dept., 155 S. C. 77, 151 S.E. 887
(1930), the Court admitted that that decision had been quoted and followed by
the Courts of Kansas (see note 24 supra) and Alabama (see note 25 supra) but
it also pointed out that a Texas court in Dickson v. State, 169 S.W. 2d 1005
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943) had doubted the soundness of the decision and had quoted
with approval from the dissenting opinion. The court thought that the United
States Casualty Case did not control the precise question as it was only authority
for the proposition that derivative claims as such are not authorized by the statute;
or in other words, that the proper plaintiff is the party actually damaged, but
there is nothing in the statute to preclude him from bringing the action solely
for the benefit of another who has paid his loss.
"'Jeff Hunt Machinery Co. v. State Highway Dept., 217 S. C. 423, 426, 60
S.E. 2d 859, 860 (1950).
Referring to the case at hand, the court said that to say the person sustaining
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It was in the light of these prior decisions in the state and federal
courts that the question of the right of subrogation under the North
Carolina Torts Claims Act was brought before the North Carolina
Court. In reaching a decision it was pointed out by the court that the
North Carolina statute28 is not a verbatim copy of the Federal Tort
Claims Act 29 nor of that of the State of South Carolina." ° However,
the Court felt the logic and reasoning of the federal courts, of Cothran,
J. in the first South Carolina decision, 3 ' and of the South Carolina Court
in its most recent decision,3 2 to be the better view and persuasive as
applied to the North Carolina Tort Claims Act.88
The court pointed out that subrogation is a remedy which is highly
favored and, being broad and expansive, has a liberal application.
Further, the court felt that if the defendants were private persons the
right of subrogation would clearly exist, and if the legislature in relieving itself of passing on claims had desired to exclude subrogation
it would have written that intention into the Act. Instead, the state
waived its immunity and in so doing occupies the same position as any
4
other litigant and is entitled to no special privileges.8
So reasoning, the court held that the plaintiff could maintain a
suit in its own name for the benefit of itself and its insurer, though
the insurer is a proper party, and could be made a party by the Industrial Commission or the court at its discretion8 5
In holding that the right of subrogation exists under the North
Carolina Tort Claims Act, it would appear that the North Carolina
Court has adopted the better view, aligned with the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Aetna Casualty case and the South Carolina
Supreme Court in the Jeff Hunt Machinery case. Only four state
courts have been called upon to decide the precise question, and now
stand two for and two against subrogation under Tort Claims Acts.
But it should be noted that the decisions of the two states denying
the right of subrogation are based on the decision in the first South
Carolina case, which has apparently been repudiated. How other jurisdamage
by his
foreign
reason.
28

may not bring an action
insurer would necessitate
to its spirit and purpose
Id. at 427. 60 S.E. 2d at
Note 2 supra.

because he has been compensated for the loss
writing into the statute an exception entirely
and thereby limit its meaning without sense or
860.

2'Note 5 supra.
"0Note 20 sup'ra.
1 United States Casualty Co. v. State Highway Dept., 155 S. C. 77, 87, 151
S.E.2 883, 891 (concurring and dissenting opinion). See note 23 supra.
Jeff Hunt Machinery Co. v. State Highway Dept., 217 S. C. 423, 60 S.E.
2d 859 (1950).
"Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. N. C. State Board of Education and/or Sampson
County Board of Education, 238 N. C. 24, 32, 76 S.E. 2d 553, 559 (1953).
2 Id. at 33, 76 S.E. 2d at 559.
25
Id. at 33, 76 S.E. 2d at 560.
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dictions will deal with the right of a subrogee to sue under Tort Claims
Acts remains to be seen as proper cases for determination arise, but
it would seem that the trend clearly points towards liberal construction
of such Acts and the allowance of suit either by the subrogor for the
use of the subrogee or by the subrogee in his own name.
Z. CREIGHTON BRINSON

Taxation-Income-Involuntary Change from Cash to Accrual Basis
of Accounting-Accounts Receivable and Inventory
Many small businessmen, unwary of tax pitfalls and without adequate accounting systems to record the operation of their businesses,
are jolted when the tax lightning strikes with a substantial deficiency
for a particular year due to the Commissioner's changing their method
of reporting income. In one of the typical situations, the partnership's
books were kept on the basis of cash receipts and cash disbursements.
Accounts receivable reflecting credit sales were not included in the
determination of income but inventories were used in determining the
cost of goods sold. The Tax Court approved the Commissioner's
determination that the partnership should report its net income on the
accrual basis and for the year of the change should add the amount of
accounts receivable at the beginning of the year to the proper amount
of income determined on the accrual basis.'
The Internal Revenue Code requires that net income be computed
on the basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period in accordance
2
with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books.
But if the method of keeping books does not clearly reflect the income,
the Commissioner is authorized to make a recomputation on such basis
as, in his opinion, will clearly reflect the income.3 Where inventories are
required, 4 as in the principal case, 5 the accrual method of accounting
must be used.6 However, the discretion given the Commissioner to
'David W. Hughes, P-H 1953 TC MEm. DEc. 1 53,285 (1953).
2 INT. REV. CoDE § 41, provides in part: "The net income shall be computed
upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar
year, as the case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has been so employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the, computation shall be made in accordance with such method
as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income."
3Ibid.
'U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (c)-1 (1953), provides in part: "In order to
reflect the net income correctly, inventories at the beginning and end of each
taxable year are necessary in every case in which the production, puichase, or
sale of merchandise is an income-producing factor."
' Note 1 supra.

'U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-2 (1953),

provides in part:

"...

in any

case in which it is necessary to use an inventory, no method of accounting in
regard to purchases and sales will correctly reflect income except an accrual
method."

